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BOOK REVIEWS

Naturalism and Religion, by Kai Nielsen. Prometheus Books, 2001. Pp. 506.
$40 (cloth)
MARK WYNN, University of Exeter

In this collection of essays (old and new), Kai Nielsen offers a characteristically clear and forthright formulation of a perspective for which he is
already well known. There is not much in the book that engages in detail
with recent developments in analytic philosophy of religion; indeed,
Nielsen comments that because of its habitual neglect of certain questions,
philosophy of religion in this style fails to make any serious demand upon
our attention: "I suppose we could analytically reconstruct and conceptually clarify Mary Baker Eddy's metaphysical tract too, but that would hardly
enhance interest in it or further our understanding of the significance of
religion. These analytical philosopher-theologians need first, against the
antimetaphysical arguments of Wittgenstein, Davidson, Rorty, and
Putnam, to give us some reason to think that there is in the sorts of things
they are doing something significant" (p. 20). A second, related difficulty
for mainstream analytic philosophy of religion is that it is "very rationalistic"; rather than worrying about new versions of the traditional proofs,
"what is crucial to face instead is whether we need a belief, however overwhelmed with intellectual impediments, in a Jewish, Christian or Islamic
God to make sense of our lives and to live really human lives" (p. 21). In
these remarks, Nielsen sets two kinds of challenge for contemporary philosophical theology: to confront the difficulties inherent in any kind of metaphysical claim, and to consider whether religious commitment can be
understood, and perhaps justified in some degree, by reference to its contribution to human flourishing. Let's take these challenges in tum.
Nielsen evidently thinks it rather obvious that a metaphysically committed kind of religious belief is intellectually defective. Indeed, thinking in
particular of the metaphysical dimension of religious belief, he comments:
"I remain utterly flabbergasted that reflective, intelligent, and informed
people ... can be believers" (p. 393). Naturally Nielsen wonders whether
his inability to understand the commitments of 'intelligent and informed'
people raises a question about whether he has fully understood what is at
stake here. Even so, the very obviousness of the case for atheism, from his
point of view, seems at times to get in the way of a detailed presentation of
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the requisite arguments. Quite a lot of the time, Nielsen's case proceeds by
allusion to what are taken to be the established findings of other philosophers (Hume, Kant and the quartet of Wittgenstein et al cited above figure
largely). In this spirit he wonders: "Must we continue to redo ... the work
that Hume and Kant did so well before us? Should we continue to play the
role of Philo? Standing where we stand now to do any of these things
seems to be extremely Quixotic" (p 67).
In general terms, Nielsen's stance is that theism comes in two varieties,
the anthropomorphic variety (taking God to be some sort of Olympian
entity) and the non anthropomorphic: the first has been falsified, and the
second is incoherent (p. 33). So even if the stars were to spell out "God
exists" (reading "God" nonanthropomorphically), this would no more
help than if they were to spell out "procrastination drinks melancholy"; in
such a case, "we know that something has shaken our world, but we know
not what" (p. 279). As one would expect, Nielsen's case against nonanthroporn orphic theism has at times a verificationist feel. For instance, he comments that (by comparison with judgements such as "Britain is independent of Germany"), "to say that something is independent of the world has
no such clear sense or - so at least it seems - any sense. How do we identify that something is independent of the world?" (p. 474) But elsewhere, he
is careful to argue that some strands of his case for naturalism are free from
verificationist assumptions, and he acknowledges that verificationism can
be only part of a larger case against theism. Here he offers this retraction of
his earlier views: "What we need to see, and what I for a long time did not
see, is that the verificationist arguments do not play the central role in the
critique of religion that I, and many others, took them to play" (p. 486). A
number of arguments establish, Nielsen thinks, the simple contradictoriness of key theistic ideas, so freeing his case from over-reliance on verificationist assumptions. For instance, he rejects the notion of an "infinite individual" on these grounds: "Something could not be an individual unless she
or it were differentiated from other individuals or things. But something
that is infinite cannot (logically cannot) be so differentiated .... for something which is infinite is not bounded" (p. 473, Nielsen's emphasis).
Similarly, "We do not understand 'made out of nothing.' That at least
sounds like a contradiction in terms. To make something, even a tune, to
say nothing of a pie, a ship, or a proof, is to make it out of something" (p.
474). It is worth noting that it is not only theism that falls foul of Nielsen's
strictures; so also does a claim such as "physical objects exist," for: "What
empirical evidence could prove or disprove it?" (p. 448)
What should we make of this case? While in admiration of the clarity
and robustness of its formulation, and the range of its references to the
philosophical literature, I find Nielsen's stance at times overconfident, and
dependent upon overgeneralizing or in other ways oversimplifying claims
about what religious belief involves. For example, leaving aside the fact
that a long tradition of philosophical theology has wondered about the
sense in which God may be adequately characterized as an "individual," is
it so obvious that the notion of infinity as it operates here signifies something like "all encompassing" or "all inclusive"; given suitable spelling out,
that would make for a contradiction, but shouldn't this just alert us to the
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need to think harder about what theists have meant by "infinite"? There
are, certainly, some forms of theism (for example, "first cause" theism)
which seem to invite objections of broadly this kind; but doesn't this suggest that we need to distinguish between kinds of theism, and the sense in
which they speak of God as "infinite," with greater care than Nielsen does
here? Similarly, the argument against the notion of creation out of nothing
seems overquick. Theists themselves have often challenged the coherence
of notions which are not straightforwardly contradictory (such as the
notion of an uncaused event), so they have reason to have some sympathy
for the sort of project in which Nielsen is engaged here; but in these cases
too, the alleged incoherence is not just obvious. And if Nielsen's principles
commit him to the thought that "physical objects exist" is not factually
meaningful, then some at least will conclude: so much the worse for the
principles. Even Nielsen's treatment of the case of the stars seems overconfident. This example seems mostly comical, but if nothing else, perhaps
such an event ought to make us think anew about our capacity to assess a
priori the limits of metaphysical possibility.
What of the second strand of Nielsen's case, which on his view addresses issues more deserving of discussion? We want to know why it is that
theism is unfit to contribute to human flourishing. Part of the problem
seems to lie with the tendency of believers to seek certainty: "Here we can
see a crucial difference between a religious stance and an utterly secular
one, and again we find good reasons here for being secularists. It is a cultural achievement to be able to abandon the quest for certainty" (p. 66).
More seriously perhaps, Nielsen supposes that "a Christian morality is
very different from a secular one" and that it is "irresponsible" to advocate
such a morality for: "Such indiscriminate love of our enemies or to see no
one as our enemy can only lead to grave harm for us" (pp. 455-6). In place
of this ideal, Nielsen offers "mutual reciprocity." Here again, the case surely invites elaboration. Do all varieties of religious belief aim at certainty?
And even where they do aim at certainty, do they understand the notion in
the same way? Nielsen's case seems to presuppose an identification of religious certainty with something like fanaticism, but here again it is not difficult to find a more sympathetic reading of the notion as it has informed
religious practice. Of course, Nielsen recognizes in principle the need to
attend to different forms of religious belief (and he makes a similar move
himself, on p. 98, when defending naturalism from an overgeneralizing
charge of fostering a "tragic vision"), but his conception of the sort of life
that is consistent with religious commitment still seems somewhat truncated. Similarly, there are various understandings of what it means to "love
one's enemy," not all of them (many of them?) implying (as Nielsen seems
to suppose) passive accommodation of the wishes of aggressors.
Even so, there is much that "philosopher-theologians" can learn from
this book. Notably, while Nielsen advocates naturalism, it is emphatically a
non-scientistic kind of naturalism, one that remains open to the "normative" dimension of human life, a dimension that believers too will want to
safeguard against the encroachments of familiar kinds of reductionism.
Similarly, Nielsen upholds (against "relativism") the possibility of dialogue
across traditions (pp. 411-14). This view suggests that appeal to "revela-
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tion" need not after all imply ethnocentrism or the arbitrary privileging of
one tradition over others (contrary to what Nielsen himself maintains)
(p.67). On~ these issues, in spite of himself, Nielsen provides some helpful
pointers to the shape of a more acute philosophical theology.

The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser. London
and New York: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 292. $32.95 (paper).
JEANINE DILLER, Independent Scholar
With thirteen previously unpublished essays by prominent philosophers, Copan and Moser argue in this volume that theism "better resolves
major philosophical questions than do its alternatives, including its most
influential intellectual rival, naturalism" (3). The argument comes in three
stages. Part I of the book consists of preliminary considerations designed
to ready both the mind and the spirit to consider a sustained argument for
theism. Part II is the positive piece of this argument and the core of the
book. Like Swinburne's The Existence of God, the work of Part II is meant to
comprise a cumulative case--the arguments presented are "to be considered not in isolation from, but in combination with, one another" (9). Part
III presents responses to two objections to theism: the argument from incoherence and the problem of evil.
Let me begin by examining Davis' discussion of the ontological argument, and some related content from Taliaferro's discussion of the coherence of theism. Davis sets himself the manageable and useful task of replying to Michael Martin's criticisms of Anselm's and Plantinga's versions of
the argument. I will focus here just on his treatment of Martin's critiques
of Anselm.
One of Martin's complaints is that, even if existence is a predicate, it
does not add to the greatness of things for, e.g., undesirable things. Davis'
reply is ingenious. He suggests that we read the term "greatness" in tlLe
argument as "power, ability, or freedom of action," even if this is not all
that Anselm might have meant by it, because this notion "at least has a
chance of making the ontological argument work" (98). This reading guarantees, contra Martin, that "exists" is a great-making property, since an
existing thing will necessarily, for better or worse, have more power than
the mere concept of this thing (100).
Davis' "power" reading of "great" also helps him respond to Martin's
second criticism, from Gaunilo, that he can construct "parallel ontological
arguments" to prove the existence of the greatest conceivable lost island,
etc. Davis develops a dilemma to argue that there can be no such things.
First, if we try to conceive the greatest conceivable lost island "in terms that
islands can possibly have, properties like temperature, the beauty of the
scenery," and so on, "these properties have no intrinsic maximums ... so
there logically can be no 'greatest conceivable lost island'." But if instead
we try to conceive the island in a wider sense of "conceive," and allow it to
take on predicates that islands cannot possibly have, then "the greater we

